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On November 28 1986, the Ministry of Finance's Securities 
Exchange Advisory Council proposed a significant relaxation of 
restrictions on domestic corporate bond issuance. The number of 
corporations eligible for issuing unsecured straight bonds would 
triple to 180, the issuing unit of privately placed bonds would 
quintuple to 10 billion yen, and firms would be permitted to 
issue at any time during the month instead of at month's end as 
formerly stipulated. Moreover, in a break with a long tradition, 
firms with a high enough corporate rating would be allowed to 
issue unsecured bonds even though they do not meet the 
conventional standards of eligibility. 1 
At first glance, this would appear to be a serious blow to 
the interests of the banking community: the easier it is for 
corporations to issue bonds, the less they must depend on banks 
loans for their external financing. In fact, however, most banks 
The Japan Economic Journal, (November 8, 1986), p. 2; 
Beginning in spring 1989, ceilings on the amount of funds 
corporations can issue through unsecured bonds will be eliminated 
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did not fight the change.2 This chapter will explain why not. 
The story line will unfold as follows: banks succeed in 
squelching the domestic bond market, to the benefit of their loan 
business. Once firms become strong enough to raise funds in the 
Euromarket, however, they take their business overseas. Banks 
follow them abroad and recapture some of the business, but suffer 
nevertheless from the abandonment of the domestic market. In 
attempting to stem the trend towards securitization, banks cut 
their spreads on domestic loans. With the domestic loan market 
consequently less profitable and hence less worth fighting for, 
the banks finally agree to woo firms back home by making the 
domestic bond market more attractive, in exchange for a larger 
role for banks in the private placement market. 
Deregulation of the bond market, however, is more than an 
interesting story. Changes in the bond market help to explain 
the trend towards direct finance in Japan. Secondly, an 
examination of the process helps to generate more general 
propositions as to the how and why of financial deregulation. 
Thirdly, this case study affords a penetrating look at the 
government-business nexus in Japan. 
z
 It should be noted that in this chapter we are primarily 
referring to large banks and their blue chip customers. Small 
banks are not directly affected by changes in bond market rules 
since small firms, their main clientele, do not have ready access 
to bond markets anyway. 
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II. The History of the Bond Market 
The 1920s were the "golden age" of Japan's bond market. 
Buoyed by the demand for industrial and consumer goods from war 
stricken Europe, Japanese manufacturers enjoyed an unprecedented 
production boom. And to finance capacity expansion, large 
corporations turned to the domestic bond market for one third to 
one half of their funding needs.3 Firms were attracted to the 
convenience of the bond market since they were free to choose 
among maturities of one to thirty years, and among numerous 
denominations, large and small. Banks, moreover, did not mind 
that bank loans accounted for only 5% or so of the large 
corporate finance market; banks were free to underwrite corporate 
bonds, and keep them in their own portfolios or pass them along 
to securities firms for distribution to the public.4 
Once Europe's economy recovered from the devastation of 
World War I, the floor dropped out from under Japan's expanded 
export sector. Many firms defaulted on their bonds, leaving bond 
holders including banks with nothing. Beginning with the 
collapse of the Bank of Taiwan and the subsequent bank panic in 
1927, hundreds of banks folded in the following years. The total 
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number of banks shrank from 1,283 banks in 1927 to 538 banks in 
1932.5 
The Ministry of Finance was caught by surprise; there was no 
creditor protection mechanism in place, and the Ministry was 
forced to subsidize numerous ailing banks from government coffers 
to contain the disruption in financial markets. 
Politicians, meanwhile, were concerned about their small 
constituents who claimed that they were bearing the brunt of the 
recession. In May 1929 the Giichi Tanaka Cabinet responded to he 
small business sector's massive lobbying by drafting "An Outline 
for Restructuring Small Business Finance," which was a design for 
ensuring that the consolidation of the financial sector did not 
eliminate the flow of funds to small enterprises. In a policy 
measure that is maintained to the present day, the smallest tier 
of financial institutions was prohibited from lending to firms 
larger than a given size. In the following year the MOF with 
funds gathered from postal savings was ordered to disburse 50 
million yen to small business. At the same time, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry attempted to organize cartels and industry 
associations to help small business deal with "excess 
competition." 6 
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To prevent such a financial debacle from recurring, the MOF 
took advantage of the widespread uncertainty to draft a new 
banking law in 1927. The new legislation gave MOF broad, vaguely 
specified powers of oversight. In exchange for tolerating more 
extensive government intervention, however, banks obtained the 
MOF's protection and assurance of no further entries into the 
banking business. For this, the banks would thank their friends 
in the Kenseikai, Seiyu Honto, and the Seiyukai. 
The MOF was not able to reduce drastically the number of 
banks as it desired. The Seiyukai spearheaded a movement in the 
Diet, later joined by the Kenseikai and Seiyu Honto, to lower the 
MOF's proposed minimum figure for banks1 mandatory capital base. 
Thus a tier of small banks on the MOF's black list survived the 
post-crash consolidation. The alternative to protective 
legislation would have been the establishment of a robust 
depositor insurance scheme and the imposition of strict balance 
sheet rules that would limit bank risk-taking to a certain 
proportion of their portfolios. Only a powerful, politically-
independent MOF could have obtained such a bill. Instead, banks 
received protectionist legislation. It was this Banking Law of 
1927, then, rather than the postwar reform, that established the 
"convoy system" of bank protection.7 
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Now banks, though there were fewer of them, were on more 
solid ground with the MOF as their guarantor. Their next move 
was to strengthen their position against corporate borrowers. 
With the MOF's blessing, about 3 0 of the largest bond-
underwriting banks formed the Kisaikai or Bond Issue Arrangement 
Committee (hereafter Bond Committee) soon after the bank panic in 
order to "clean up the bond market". The Bond Committee 
established the collateral principle which persists in modified 
form to the present day: "Corporate bonds shall not be issued 
without sufficient collateral." In a successful power play, the 
banks then gained another source of income: according to the Bond 
Committee's rules, only "trustee banks" (iutaku ginko) would be 
permitted to manage the collateral until the maturity of the 
bond, for a fee. 
At the core of the Bond Committee were eight banks, with the 
Industrial Bank of Japan central among them. Security firms were 
given a cut of the market as underwriting members of the Bond 
Committee, but only banks could earn the collateral fee. When 
Yamaichi Securities attempted in the late 192 0s to take over a 
"Shin Ginko Hoan no Shusei Kaketsu," Ginko Tsushinroku, (April 
20, 1927), pp. 106-107; "Zaikai Fuan ni Taisuru Zosho no Seimei", 
Ginko Tsushinroku, (April 20, 1927), pp. 123-124; "Okurasho no 
Sekkyokuteki Ginko Godo Sokushin," Ginko Tsushinroku, (August 20, 
1927), pp. 65-55; "Okurasho no Ginko Gappei Sokushin," Ginko 
Tsushinroku, (October 20, 1927), pp. 63-64 
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trustee bank to capture some of the collateral-management 
business, the MOF blocked the move.8 
One of the most enduring effects of the Bond Committee's 
rules was the shift it engendered in Japanese corporate finance 
to reliance on bank loans. Naturally, corporations responded to 
the new collateral requirement by reducing their reliance on bond 
issuance for financing. In 1931 bonds accounted for 29.9% of 
corporate external funding, and bank loans for 13.6%. In 1934, 
bonds accounted for 6.3% of external funding; in 1936 
corporations issued almost no bonds at all, depending instead on 
bank loans for 4 0.6% of their funding needs.9 
Firms continued, however, to rely on equity issues for a 
substantial part of their financing. In 1933 equity accounted 
for 31.1% of corporate funding, and in 1936, 33.5%. The figure 
only dropped dramatically during World War II when savings were 
channeled into savings banks for the war effort, from 2 2.6% in 
1943 to 9.1% in 1944 and 6.1% in 1945. 1 0 
In the decade between 1936 and 1945, banks lost any autonomy 
they may have had, and the question of bank power in the economy 
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became a moot point. Beginning with the "Temporary Law of Credit 
Allocation" enacted in 1937, the military seized increasing 
control of the nation's financial mechanisms. Manufacturers of 
military hardware were ensured preferential access to money, be 
it through bank lending or through the bond market. In fact, the 
military found the Bond Committee a convenient apparatus through 
with to operate. 
III. The Recovery and Rapid Growth Years 
In December 1945, the MOF's Financial System Research 
Council established a subcommittee to study the bond market. 
Representatives from the securities industry argued that banks 
should not be allowed to underwrite bonds as they had in the 
prewar years, because their aim would be to stifle the market in 
favor of bank loans. Bankers insisted otherwise. Because of the 
sharp disagreement, the deliberations sputtered to a near halt; 
the purge in 1946 of those "implicated in the war effort" 
delivered a final blow to the discussion when it removed most 
members of the Council and its securities market subcommittee.-1-1 
SCAP bypassed the dispute with its blueprint for the 194 8 
Securities Exchange Law. SCAP's purpose, drawn from the Glass-
Steagall Act in the U.S., was 1) to protect bank depositors from 
banks' risky portfolio management and potential conflicts of 
1 1
 Yasuji Abe, op cit., p. 52 
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interest, and 2) to promote greater competition between indirect 
financing through bank loans and direct financing on the bond and 
equity markets. Although Article 65 of the Securities Exchange 
Law precluded banks from underwriting public placement bonds, 
banks were allowed participation in the private placement market 
as in the U.S., since the buyers would be knowledgeable 
institutional investors. But this was a minimal concession, 
because there were few incentives for corporations to seek 
private placements of their bonds. First, the volume for each 
issue was severely limited. Secondly, the "no return rule" 
prohibited corporations from ever resorting to private placement 
once they had placed bonds publicly. A more important concession 
to the banks was the admission of the collateral principle in the 
bond market. The Bond Committee survived not only the war, but 
the Occupation as well.12 
The government played a sizable role in allocating capital 
through the bond market in the earliest postwar years. But this 
should not be exaggerated, either in scope or in duration. Soon 
after the war ended, Prime Minister Yoshida appointed Koj i 
Arisawa, an economics professor at the University of Tokyo, to 
head a group to examine strategies for resuscitating Japan's 
basic industries such as coal and petroleum. Also in the group 
were young bureaucrats who would later make their mark in their 
respective ministries, including Yoichi Oshima from MOF, 
1 2
 Hanju Takeuchi, op cit., pp. 68-69; 
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Toshihiko Yoshino from the Bank of Japan, Saburo Okita from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masato Toru from SCAP, and Shuzo 
Inaba from the National Economic Research Council.13 
In May 1946, Tanzan Ishibashi, known for his preference for 
fiscal stimulation, became Finance Minister. Ishibashi lost no 
time in expanding the work and authority of the Coal Committee, 
and in June 1946 the Cabinet approved his "Provisional Financial 
Policy for Postwar Industrial Reconstruction" (Sengo Sangyo 
Saiken no tame no Okyuteki Kinyu Tasaku). In July, Ishibashi 
converted the Coal Committee into the Reconstruction Finance 
Committee, under his chairmanship. This group drafted the 
Reconstruction Bank Bill and the Temporary Law for Credit 
Allocation, which were passed into law in January 1947. The 
Credit Allocation Law placed the Bond Committee physically inside 
the Bank of Japan, and added as Committee members representatives 
from the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan, and the Economic 
Stabilization Board. Once a month the Bond Committee met to set 
the terms of bond issuance, giving preference to fuel industries, 
steel, and utilities companies. 
In November 1948, SCAP issued a nine-point memorandum 
calling for even stricter credit rationing measures than the Bond 
Committee had been implementing. Citing inflation as an imminent 
13
 Toshihiko Yoshino, Sengo Kinyushi no Qmoide, (Tokyo: 
Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1975), pp. 119-127 
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danger, "only business contributing to Japan's recovery should be 
funded," the memorandum instructed.14 In 1949 the Temporary Law 
for Credit Allocation was scrapped, but the Bank of Japan 
continued to exert influence on bond issuance until 1955 by 
granting lowest interest loans to the banks that could put up 
"priority bonds" as collateral. The banks did not mind the 
government's hand in credit allocation, as long as the government 
guaranteed payment in full upon maturity of the bonds.15 
The government, or at least parts of it, was not entirely 
content to leave credit allocation solely to the banks after 
1955. In August 1962, a MITI advisory board, the Industrial 
Order Committee, advocated greater "public-private cooperation" 
in financing Japanese industry. By December MITI had drafted a 
"Law of Special Measures for Strengthening the International 
Competitive Ability of Designated Industries," (Tokutei Sangyo 
Kyosoryoku Kyoka Tokubetsusochi Hoan). Jigen Sahashi, Director 
of MITI's Enterprise Bureau and architect of the plan, was 
seeking legal authority to tighten up Japan's industrial 
structure with government-facilitated mergers. Banks, under this 
law, would have no choice but to support financing plans for 
industries designated by MITI. Banks fought tenaciously for 
their autonomy, and were joined in opposition to the law by 
1 4
 Toshihiko Yoshino, op cit., pp. 195-199 
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op cit., pp. 127-131 
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weaker industries that would fall prey to MITI's consolidation 
plan. MITI nevertheless submitted the law to the Diet, diluting 
certain provisions by way of compromise. But bank lobbying was 
successful, and MITI was forced to beat a full retreat. The Diet 
refused to pass the bill in three consecutive sessions.16 
After the government had removed its hand from credit 
allocation in 1955, the Bond Committee screened corporations on 
the basis of a matrix of capital ratios, granting eligibility to 
very few corporations. In the early postwar years, most bonds 
were floated by the electric utility companies and heavy 
industrial firms since they met the demanding capital 
requirements, and by certain financial institutions 
themselves. 1 7 
In 1946 SCAP had banned financial institutions from issuing 
bonds, on grounds that banks would crowd other corporations out 
of the bond market. But this measure was overturned in 1950 at 
the insistence of the Industrial Bank of Japan, and a heated 
debate ensued within the financial sector as to which 
institutions should be allowed to issue debentures. The Bank of 
1 6
 Akiyoshi Horiuchi, "Economic Growth and Financial 
Allocation in Postwar Japan," Discussion Paper, Research 
Institute for the Japanese Economy, University of Tokyo,( August 
1984), pp. 57-58; Kazuhiko Hayashibara, Makunouchi Tsusansho, 
(Tokyo: Yell Publishers, 1979), pp.479-483 
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 Shoken Dantai Kyogikai, "Shasai Hakko Shijo no Genjo to 
Kongo no Kadai," (May 6, 1986), pp. 19-21 
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Tokyo, which specialized in international finance and also had 
few domestic branches, wished to raise money on the bond market 
as well. Most banks, however, preferred that they not be allowed 
to issue bonds because this would spur competition among them and 
thus erode their profits. The MOF argued, on the other hand, 
that such competition was desirable. 
Because the MOF and banks were unable to come to terms, the 
debate reached the halls of the Diet. In 1951, just before 
general elections in April, a young Minshuto politician named 
Yasuhiro Nakasone spearheaded an attack in the Diet against the 
Jiyuto administration for allowing the Bank of Tokyo to issue 
debentures. This would lead to, in Nakasone's words, "excessive 
competition" among the banks.18 Ultimately, a compromise allowed 
the three long term credit banks, eight trust banks, the Bank of 
Tokyo, and quasi-governmental institutions to issue debentures 
since these all had few branches from which to collect deposits. 
So as not to compete with bank deposits, the maturity of the 
debentures were set at five and seven years for the long term 
credit banks, and three years for the Bank of Tokyo.19 
1 8
 Kinyu Zaisei Jiio recorded the spirited exchanges on the 
floor of the Diet: (February 12, 1951), pp. 20-21; (February 26, 
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 This compromise was enshrined only in administrative 
guidance, not in statute. But it was challenged only decades 
later when city banks, limited to short term deposits, wanted to 
raise long term funds for loans in the Euromarket. 
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Banks reabsorbed over half of all corporate bonds and 
financial debentures themselves.20 As investors, then, they had 
a decisive voice in determining the volume that could be issued 
each month. And they made sure the amount was not enough to cut 
into their lending business. The Commercial Code, moreover, 
prohibited a corporation from issuing bonds in excess of twice 
its capital base.21 
Why was there not a revolt against the banks? Would not 
some group be better off without the Bond Committee? Certainly 
the small saver would benefit if market-yield bond instruments 
were to provide an alternative to below-market bank deposits. 
But predictably, the free rider problem prevailed. Because the 
payoffs of reform to any individual would amount to, say, a few 
hundred yen a year, mounting a costly campaign to overturn the 
status quo would simply not be worth the expense unless the costs 
could be distributed widely. No political entrepreneurship was 
forthcoming. 
2 0
 Note that interest rates on bonds were low (lower than 
on long-term loans) so many corporations wanted to issue, but 
there were no takers. The MOF wanted low interest rates, 
and did not want a secondary market to develop that would put 
upward pressure on the government bond issuance rate. Banks 
bought a disproportionate share of new corporate issues, and 
agreed not to sell them on the secondary market. See Hugh 
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The other institutional investors, such as the life and 
casualty insurance companies and trust banks, also got higher 
yields on their long-term loans to the corporations under the 
regulated system. Even the representatives from the securities 
industry on the Bond Committee, which happened to be the "Big 
Four", did not protest vociferously. Although there were over 
250 securities houses, these four, Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa, and 
Yamaichi, took turns lead-managing most issues, and captured 7 5% 
of all underwriting commissions. These commissions, moreover, 
were fixed, precluding competition. Were they to rock the boat, 
they would certainly also get wet.22 
Nor did the MOF have reason to object. First, the market 
was orderly and stable. There was little chance of another bond 
market disaster with the collateral principle in operation. 
Secondly, in the early postwar years, the Committee agreed to 
undertake bond issuance for the basic industries targeted for 
rapid recovery. Thirdly, after the government began issuing 
bonds in 1965, and in greater volume in 1975, the MOF had more 
reason to appreciate the Committee. A constricted corporate bond 
market made it easier for the MOF to place its own bonds. By the 
early 1980s, 95% of all new bond issues in Japan were made either 
2 2
 Kikuo Iwata, "Kisai Chosei ni Kansuru Somondai," Sophia 
Economic Review, (Vol. XXIX, No. 2, 1986), pp. 12-13 
17 
by governmental units or one of the banks themselves. 2 3 This 
was an acceptable barter for both the banks and the MOF: banks 
would not lose their corporate loan business, and the MOF would 
have the bulk of the domestic bond market for its own issues. It 
is no mistake that the Bond Committee forms the core of the 
Government Bond Syndicate as well.24 
Only industry had reason to object to the Bond Committee's 
deliberate suppression of the bond market's development. But 
even industry did not begin to voice strong objections until the 
1970s. During the recovery and rapid growth years in the postwar 
economy, firms wanted access to a steady stream of credit more 
than anything else. Especially in the sectors in which 
investment was virtually synonymous with growth, leveraging with 
debt made a great deal of sense. Bank debt in particular could 
provide the stability for long term planning. Second, firms 
wanted the availability of extra credit in bad times. For these 
assurances, firms were willing to pay a premium, as it were, to 
their main bank. But in any case, bank trustee fees for 
collateral reduced the cost differential for firms between the 
interest rates on bonds and on long term loans. Third, the 
alternative, which was a bond market based on a rating system, 
would require continuous disclosure for investor protection. And 
2 3
 David W. Wise, "Corporate Debentures and the 
Internationalization of the Japanese Bond Market," Columbia 
Journal of World Business, (Fall 1982), p. 41 
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 Interviews with bankers and Ministry of Finance officials. 
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fourth, heavy industry was actually favored by the domestic bond 
market rules because of importance accorded to plant and 
equipment. Steel corporations, for example, would have more 
difficulty placing bonds for a reasonable price in Europe than in 
Japan because the Euromarket rating system operates on the basis 
of corporate health rather than on volume of capital stock.25 
IV. Leakage to the Euromarket 
The deceleration of the Japanese economy brought to an end 
industry's insatiable demand for bank loans. Japan emerged from 
the post oil shock recession of 1975, but with real GNP growth 
rates in the 3% to 6% range rather than the 10% to 12% range of 
an era gone by. Because slower growth meant lower profit rates 
and fewer lucrative investment opportunities for most 
corporations, interest payments on bank loans had become a 
unwieldy portion of corporate earnings. The interest payments on 
2 5
 Iwao Nakatani claims that the grouping of firms does not 
generally increase the rates of profit or growth of the firms, 
but that volatility of performance is significantly reduced. 
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Australia-Japan Research Centre; S. Suzuki and R. Wright, 
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the University of Tokyo, emphasize the economies of information 
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19 
large bank debt, which had been a reasonable insurance premium 
for steady credit, had become an unworkable burden.26 
In what seemed to banks to be a stampede, firms began paring 
down their bank loans in the mid 1970s. Some firms managed to 
work within the limits of their retained earnings and 
depreciation allowances. Others that still needed outside 
financing turned to the equity market, to a limited extent to the 
domestic bond market, or increasingly to the Euromarket. The 
ratio of new direct financing from all sources to new indirect 
financing jumped from 11.49% in 1973 to 20.44% in 1975.27 Only 
the small business sector and the structurally depressed 
industries such as steel had no real alternative to bank 
borrowing, or in the case of heavy industry, to the domstic bond 
market.28 
Even as Japan's economy was entering a phase of slower 
growth, at least the larger Japanese corporations were securing 
market share and name recognition abroad. And with that came 
access to foreign financial markets. The possibility of 
2 6
 Nagatomi, op cit., pp. 34-37 
2 7
 Stephen Bronte, "The Revolution in Japanese Corporate 
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financing abroad spurred the trend towards smaller bank debt, not 
only because it was an alternative. Two other factors were 
instrumental. First, in international markets the best corporate 
ratings, and hence the cheapest money, go to firms with a strong 
capital base, or low debt-equity ratio. Secondly, for a mature 
corporation in a slower growth era, an assured stream of credit 
is not as urgent as considerations of cost and flexibility. 
This is not to say that the typically high debt-equity 
structure of Japanese corporations has transformed over night. 
Some extraordinarily strong firms, such as Toyota Motors and 
Matsushita Electric have managed to cut their bank loans down to 
zero on the strength of their retained earnings. Few firms, 
however, have resorted to large stock issues to retire debt. In 
Japan, where cross share holding is frequently a means of 
protecting management from takeover, equity capital is more 
costly than it might otherwise be. The stable share holders are 
often compensated by way of a below-market purchase price of each 
new issuance of shares.29 
Given the cost of domestic bond and equity issuance, the 
Eurobond market where are no collateral requirements began to 
look attractive to Japanese corporations. The Ministry of 
2 9
 Colin McKinsey, research scholar at the Bank of Japan 
Institute of Monetary Policy. Interviews with bankers and 
securities dealers. Others argue that stable shareholding is 
declining, though it is difficult to measure with precision. Toyo 
Keizai. (October 26, 1985), pp. 30-38 
21 
Finance did enforce a matrix of capital and asset requirements, 
mirroring the domestic rules, for Japanese corporations issuing 
bonds even in foreign currencies in the Euromarket. Not to do so 
would have been to render domestic restrictions meaningless. But 
even with similar asset requirements, funding abroad was cheaper 
because there was no collateral requirement, no mandatory 
prospectus, and because there was a panoply of flexible rate 
instruments and swaps that reduced interest rate and exchange 
rate risks to corporations. Over the years as a growing number 
of corporations became large enough to qualify and the desire for 
flexibility increased, the leakage to foreign markets escalated. 
Beginning in the mid 1970s, when slow growth set in, the number 
of Japanese corporate bond issues in the Euromarket actually 
began to skyrocket. 
A few firms had issued bonds abroad, beginning with Sumitomo 
Metals and Kawasaki Steel in 1961, but the total volume was 
small. In the early 1970s, the Euromarket accounted for a total 
of 1.7% of Japanese corporate financing; the figure for the 
latter half of the 1970s was 19.6%. By 1984 the figure was 36.2% 
of all corporate financing. As a percentage of all Japanese 
corporate bonds issued, the Euromarket accounted for 51.9% in 
1984. As chart * shows, Swiss Franc convertible bonds accounted 
for a large portion of Japanese Euromarket fund raising, because 
far more companies qualified for this category of issuance under 
22 
the MOF's matrix.30 In January 1986, for example, 700 Japanese 
companies were authorized to issue foreign currency convertible 
bonds in Europe, but only 80 were permitted to issue unsecured 
straight Eurocurrency bonds. 
While smaller corporations did not pass the minimum capital 
requirement, large trading companies passed on a portion of their 
foreign-raised funds in the form of trade credits to 
subcontractors. The flight from Japan's domestic loan market was 
serious.31 
Japanese banks responded, not by relinquishing restrictions 
on the domestic bond market, but by following the corporations 
abroad in hopes of recapturing some of the business. Unlike at 
home, the Euromarket had no Article 65 equivalent barring banks 
from securities activities. Abroad, Japanese banks were free to 
ride the wave of securitization. In the early 1970s most of the 
large banks either established wholly owned investment bank 
subsidiaries, or joined in joint ventures with British merchant 
3 0
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banks. All was well after all, it seemed. Until the Japanese 
securities industry cried foul. 
V. The Three Bureaus Agreement 
In April 1969, in the early stages of Japanese entry into 
the Euromarket, a fully owned subsidiary of the Bank of Tokyo 
~ participated in an underwriting syndicate for a Eurodollar 
issuance by Honda Motors. Although Goldman Sachs and Nikko 
Securities were the lead underwriters, the securities industry 
argued that any Japanese bank pariticipation in underwriting 
syndicates for Japanese corporate bonds ran counter to Article 65 
of the Securities Exchange Law. Banks would most certainly carry 
out most of their negotiations with the issuing firm on Japanese 
soil and simply book the transaction in Europe. Moreover, said 
the securities industry, banks would use their "main bank power" 
to ensure Japanese firms chose banks over securities firms. 
What disturbed the securities industry was not the legal 
technicalities, but the loss of their direct finance monopoly to 
the banking industry. Tough luck if indirect finance was upon 
hard times. Banks knew precisely what the securities firms meant 
to communicate, but countered on a level of legality and logic. 
Because Bank of Tokyo's subsidiary was incorporated under French 
corporate law, Japan's Article 65 should not apply to its 
activities. 
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The MOF's response is revealing. It advised the Bank of 
Tokyo not to pursue Japanese clients "too actively" in the 
Eurobond market. Foreign clients would be fair game for either 
side.32 For the MOF as for the disputing sides, the underlying 
issue was not so much the letter of the law as it was market 
share and invasion of segmented markets. Maintaining a balance 
between the banking and securities industries was critical to the 
smooth functioning of financial policy. Should either side force 
the matter into a full-blown political problem, the MOF would 
lose credibility with the regulated parties and subsequently have 
difficulty mending the fissures. 
During the transition between fixed and floating exchange 
rates from 1971 to 1973, the MOF exercised its emergency powers 
to prohibit Japanese firms from issuing any bonds overseas. No 
sooner had the ban been lifted than banks and securities became 
embroiled in another jurisdictional dispute. On April 24, 1974 
Fuji-Kleinwort Benson became one of the managing underwriters for 
a convertible bond issuance for Cannon in the Euromarket. Once 
again, the securities industry objected. Banks joining 
underwriting syndicates was bad enough, but for them to become a 
managing underwriter was going too far, the securities firms 
declared. (Managing underwriters have more responsibility for 
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the issue's success, and for which they get substantially higher 
commissions.) Moreover, they said, Fuji was more likely to abuse 
its power as a lending institution than the Bank of Tokyo, since 
the latter specializes in international finance and has a weaker 
domestic client base.33 
With tempers rising in both the banking and securities 
industries, in April 1974 the MOF's Banking Bureau, the 
Securities Bureau, and the International Finance Bureau issued a 
joint circular to "clarify" the government's position. Actually, 
the MOF was deliberately vague because it was still not sure 
where the line should be drawn to silence the dispute. The 
circular's two brief paragraphs advised that 1) When 
participating in the Eurobond market (especially as managing 
underwriters), foreign subsidiaries of Japanese banks should take 
care not to break the spirit of the Securities Exchange Law; and 
2) Banks in joint venture arrangements with foreign investment or 
merchant banks should be equipped to handle Eurobond placements 
without straining their own portfolios.34 
Because the MOF was noncommittal, banks continued to test 
the waters. In 1974 the Industrial Bank of Japan submitted an 
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application to the International Finance Bureau for a 100% 
subsidiary to engage exclusively in securities activities in the 
Euromarket. Permission would require agreement among the three 
overseeing bureaus, but the Securities Bureau opposed while the 
Banking Bureau supported IBJ's plan. The Securities Bureau, in 
agreement with the securities industry, argued that because this 
subsidiary would be located physically within the IBJ's London 
branch office, and because it would be capitalized only at 6 
million yen, it was clearly intended as a paper company for the 
Bank. Furthermore, if this subsidiary received a banking license 
in addition, it would have a great advantage over securities 
firms in raising capital.35 
Permission for the establishment of IBJ International was 
granted in June 1975, but when it became the assistant lead 
underwriter for New Nippon Steel's Eurodollar bond issuance two 
months later, the Securities Bureau expressed reservations. On 
August 29, the three bureaus called in for consultation 
representatives from nine banks and eleven securities firms. The 
MOF gave to the financial institutions two documents, one of 
which read: 
1. Japanese banks participating in foreign corporate 
bond underwriting syndicates shall pay due respect to 
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the experience gained by and the mandate given to the 
Japanese securities firms. Banks shall not act against 
the spirit of Article 65 of the Securities Exchange 
Act. 
2. In implementing the intent expressed herein, banks 
shall pay regard to the order of institutions listed on 
issuance announcements and tombstones. 
The second document reiterated the concern that banks not 
rely on their lending power to drum up customers for their 
securities operations in the Euromarket, and that banks not carry 
out their negotiations with their issuing clients on Japanese 
soil. In closing, the statement urged banks and securities firms 
to cooperate rather than fight for the same business in the 
Euromarket.36 
Rather than lay the bank-securities rivalry to rest, this 
meeting merely set out the game rules a little more clearly. Or 
more accurately, the MOF suggested a desirable goal line but left 
the means to the institutions themselves. Banks could underwrite 
Eurobonds for Japanese corporations, as long as they did not up-
stage the Japanese securities houses. Securities firms later 
interpreted the MOF's mention of the tombstone and announcement 
3 6
 "Hogin no Kaigai Genchi Hojin no Shoken Hikiuke Gyomu ni 
tsuite," Internal Memorandum of the Banking Division, Banking 
Bureau, Ministry of Finance, August 29, 1980 
28 
listings as an injunction against banks becoming book-runners or 
lead managers; but banks also had to be careful not to win a 
greater market share than the securities firms.37 
For a while the Three Bureau Agreement presided over 
peaceful coexistence in the Euromarket, incorporating minor 
clarifications as further disputes arose. Banks won free rein in 
the private placement market, for example, but securities firms 
established their supremacy in equity-linked instruments such as 
convertible bonds and warrant bonds.38 
Meanwhile, Japanese corporations' attraction to the Eurobond 
market continued unabated. On the other side of the coin, banks 
experienced more difficulty at home lending their available 
funds, which put pressure on their profit margins. The MOF could 
not ignore the changing profitability structure which favored the 
securities firms over the banks, lest the banks circumvent the 
MOF in seeking a political solution. In 1981 the MOF sent 
signals to the private sector to the effect that the Three 
Bureau's Agreement perhaps had served its function. Corporations 
now had sufficient resources, MOF officials suggested, that banks 
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would be unable to corner an undue share of the Eurobond market. 
In a break with precedent, bank subsidiaries were permitted to 
underwrite the parent bank's bonds in the Euromarket.39 
The timing was premature. In exchange for banks entry into 
government bond dealing, securities firms were given a second 
lease on the Three Bureau Agreement.40 
In 1984 other events tipped the balance. In April, the MOF 
loosened restrictions on corporate issuances of yen-denominated 
bonds in the Euromarket, and in June the MOF lifted the ceiling 
on the amount of foreign currency that corporations could 
exchange into yen. Both of these measures had the effect of 
spurring the trend towards Euromarket financing.41 Also in 1984 
the MOF announced that foreign securities houses would be 
permitted to act as the lead underwriter for Japanese corporate 
bond issues in the Euromarket.42 
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Banks were no match for the entire corporate world that 
wanted easier access to the Euromarket.43 But banks latched onto 
the MOF's permission for foreign securities firms to lead manage 
Japanese Eurobond issuances. This was reverse discriminition, 
protested the National Federation of Bank Associations in a memo 
to the MOF. If foreign financial institutions were allowed to 
compete with Japanese securities firms, Japanese banks should 
surely be allowed to as well. Moreover, the banks remonstrated, 
because it was the MOF's job to consider the international 
competitiveness of Japanese financial institutions, the MOF 
should remember that American and European banks were bound by no 
equivalent of the Three Bureaus Agreement.44 
The Banking Bureau was ready to meet the banks' demands, but 
the Securities Bureau was still under strong pressure from the 
securities industry to hold the line. The MOF would have to 
search for an acceptable barter.4^ 
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In March 1985 the MOF announced a "Comprehensive Settlement" 
of the bank-securities rivalry, lowering the dividing line 
between the two industries. The securities industry could keep 
the Three Bureaus Agreement for the time being; in addition, 
securities firms were granted permission to trade in the 
secondary market for CDs, broker in the new BA market, and lend 
to customers who had government bonds as collateral. In 
exchange, banks were permitted to offer government bond accounts 
to their customers, participate in the new bond futures market, 
and become brokers' brokers. In addition, about thirty banks in 
the second tier of the banking industry were allowed to deal in 
government bonds.4 6 
Anxious for the Three Bureaus Agreement to be lifted, banks 
were sorely disappointed. But securities firms contended that 
the only fair trade for the Agreement would be freedom to engage 
in foreign exchange transactions without bank intermediation. No 
go, cried the banks.^ 
VI. The Three Bureaus Agreement Assaulted 
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Despite the stalemate, Sumitomo Bank decided to test the 
limits of the Three Bureau Agreement. In August 1984, Sumitomo 
had purchased a majority share in Gottardo, a Switzerland-based 
universal bank. On March 28, 1985, Gottardo announced it was to 
be the lead underwriter for a Swiss franc issuance for Itohman, 
an Osaka-based trading company with strong ties to Sumitomo Bank. 
The fact that Itohman and Sumitomo had a long-standing 
relationship actually worked against Sumitomo in this case, since 
Sumitomo would have difficulty establishing that it won the bid 
without exerting "main bank pressure." Indeed, it later became 
known that Sumitomo had attempted to recruit other trading 
companies without success: companies were afraid of alienating 
the securities firms that had been underwriting for them.48 
On April 4, representatives from the Big Four securities 
firms met to join in declaring opposition to Sumitomo's 
circumvention of the Three Bureaus Agreement. Obviously a case 
of a main bank exercising its market power, said the securities 
firms. They demanded that at least the bond issue be changed 
into a private placement, since that would be within the game 
rules. Anything but an unfortunate precedent, the securities 
firms reasoned.49 
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The MOF, pressed from both industries, decided to let the 
Gottardo case pass as a "special exception" to the rule of no 
lead management of Japanese corporate bonds by Japanese banks. 
The MOF cited Gottardo*s history as an underwriter before 
Sumitomo bought its shares; it had placement power on its own 
right. While both industries accepted this solution, they 
interpreted the measure to suit their own purposes. "It was a 
clear indication that the Three Bureaus Agreement is on the wane. 
We will just have to give it time," said Hajime Yamada, Chairman 
of the Federation of Bank Associations. Shoga Watanabe, Chairman 
of the Securities Association, declared that "The Three Bureaus 
Agreement is as solid as ever."50 
They were both right. The Three Bureaus Agreement was a 
provisional measure to prevent banks from taking an "undue" share 
of the bond business in the Euromarket. It will be revoked when 
either of two conditions are met. 1) Banks1 domestic profits 
fall so much lower than those of the securities industry that the 
Agreement no longer serves its intended equilibrating function; 
or 2) Banks are willing to barter away another source of income, 
such as monopoly of the foreign exchange business. 
Ketchaku," Kinvu Business, (May 1985), pp. 12-13 
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Although the rancor between the two sectors reached several 
high points, neither side brought the problem to the politicians 
for a quick cure. As with the government bond dispute finally 
resolved in the Banking Law of 1982, the politicians are happy to 
defer delicate balancing of this sort to the MOF. From the 
standpoint of net support, either the banks or the securities 
firms would have to be so rankled as to far out-perform the other 
in political lobbying. Apparently, both sides judged that the 
amount of money required in this potentially spiraling 
competition for political patronage would overshoot the amount of 
income forgone by compromising. And because the MOF could 
monitor the compliance to the compromise, there was little risk 
of being cheated. 
VII. Deregulating the Domestic Bond Market 
Even as banks were struggling for market share in the 
Eurobond market, the domestic bond market was relatively 
stagnant. Japanese corporations had been raising money in 
foreign bond markets with increasing regularity since the mid 
1970s. This was because banks, long after making their inroads 
abroad, continued to protect their domestic loan business by 
limiting access to and the attractiveness of the domestic bond 
market. 
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By the end of 1984 the Japanese bond market was second in 
size only to the U.S., with an annual transaction volume of over 
12 trillion dollars in the secondary market. Almost all of the 
transactions, however, were in government bonds. The outstanding 
amount of corporate bonds was a mere 13% of the corresponding 
U.S. figure, and corporations raised only 4% of their funds on 
the domestic bond market.51 
Corporations1 post-oil-shock shift towards direct finance 
instruments such as bonds and equity, as well as a greater 
diversity in the performance of Japanese industries and firms, 
were structural changes that attended economic maturity and 
slower growth. For firms no longer needing a bank's apron 
strings, bonds were a sensible alternative to bank debt because 
of the lower cost and flexibility in length of term they 
afforded. 
Banks began to fight for their corporate customers. In the 
late 1970s, compensating balances began to shrink and loan 
spreads narrowed. To provide more attractive financial 
instruments, banks began issuing CDs in 1979, MMCs in 1985, and 
longer term CDs and MMCs in 1986. But banks did not loosen their 
grip on the domestic bond market until it no longer made sense 
for them not to. 
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In 1971 the Keidanren's Capital Policy Committee suggested 
that the rules for corporate bond issuance be relaxed, that bonds 
be offered in a greater variety of maturities, and that a 
corporate rating system replace the Bond Committee's set of self-
styled rules.52 Six years later, when a MOF advisory group made 
similar recommendations for bond market reform, the Bond 
Committee's rules were still much as they had been for over forty 
years.53 These reports were little more than exercises in 
wishful thinking, because many firms still depended on bank debt 
for viability, and because the banking industry was still not 
feeling sufficient pressure from the Euromarket to reform the 
domestic rules. 
By 1982, when MITI's Industrial Structure Council 
recommended that bond issuance rules be relaxed, bank resistance 
to change had begun to soften.54 Trustee banks' revenues from 
managing collateral on domestic issuances had fallen off as firms 
went to the Euromarket where issuing bonds was easier and 
cheaper. In 1981 domestically issued bonds increased 4.2% over 
the previous year, while Eurobonds increased 2.7%. By 1982 
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domestic bonds increased by 4.7%, and Eurobonds by 10.%. By 
1983, domestic bonds actually dropped by 1% while external bonds 
increased by 22. 9%.55 Because Japanese firms were not trapped 
by the banks' domestic bond rules, they did not press for reform 
with urgency; rather, it was the banks which had cause for 
consternation.56 
Simultaneously to changes in corporate funding patterns, the 
U.S. government began pressing for freer Japanese financial 
markets. American motives and tactics will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter, but suffice it here to say 
that the MOF agreed to relax restrictions on the issuance of and 
investment in Euroyen bonds over the course of 1984 and 1985. 
While this would not generate drastic changes in Japan's 
financial markets since corporations had already been issuing 
bonds abroad in foreign currencies, the development of a mature 
Euroyen bond market at least incrementally increased the pressure 
on banks to ease the domestic system.57 The ability to raise 
funds in yen was an automatic hedge against foreign exchange 
risk, and therefore an added attraction to Euromarket financing 
for Japanese firms. 
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Since 1983, banks had been negotiating with the MOF about 
how to deregulate the domestic bond market. If terms were to be 
made easier for corporate issues, securities firms would benefit 
so there would have to be some quid pro quo for the banks. The 
private placement market where banks had free rein, for example, 
should be enlarged. Moreover, the banks argued, a new rating 
system should not cut banks out of their traditional function of 
maintaining high standards for the domestic bond market.58 
In January 1984, the MOF commissioned a "Bond Study Group" 
(Shasai Mondai Kenkyukai), under the chairmanship of Hitoshi 
Hanamura, Vice Chairman of the Keidanren, to examine the 
possibilities of reform in the domestic market. On the committee 
were representatives from the major groups with an interest in 
the problem: IBJ and the top six city banks, which were also the 
seven key members of the Bond Issuance Committee; the Big Four 
securities houses; the largest insurance companies and trust 
banks; and managers of the following large corporations: Toyota, 
Hitachi, Mitsubishi Trading Company, Nippon Steel, Toray, and 
Tokyo Electric.59 
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After a year of monthly meetings, the group drafted what 
could variously be called a compromise, a stalemate, or an 
agglomeration of conflicting views. Most in the group wanted to 
stress the importance of replacing the Bond Committee's rules 
with a system of independently conducted bond ratings. The 
banks, however, added their caveat to the report that bank 
management of collateral since 1933 was responsible for 
maintaining the safety and stability of the bond market, and that 
bond rating agencies were not necessary for the domestic 
market.60 
The trustee banks were afraid of two things: 1) losing their 
loan business if bond issuance were to become too easy, and 2) 
losing their trustee commission income if the collateral 
principle were to be reconsidered. But their position was 
becoming less tenable. Already, firms were voting with their 
feet, as it were, in favor of the flexibility of the Eurobond 
market. And banks had already been forced to respond, albeit 
with great reluctance. In 1973, for example, Mitsubishi Trading, 
Komatsu, Marubeni and Kawasaki Steel had requested the right to 
issue unsecured convertible bonds on the domestic market. Banks 
accommodated to the extent of expanding their definition of 
collateral.61 In 1979 Sears Roebuck successfully invoked 
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reciprocity in obtaining permission to issue an unsecured 
straight bond in Tokyo.62 
In 1983 and 1984, banks agreed to loosen the collateral 
restrictions on domestic straight bonds and convertible bonds. 
By the end of 1984, 20 companies were eligible to issue straight 
bonds, and 110 qualified for issues of convertible bonds. Of the 
latter, nearly half were permitted to issue convertible bonds 
without collateral. Because firms could issue without collateral 
on the Euromarket, the collateral principle also began to weaken 
at home. 6 3 
Nonetheless, banks were not prepared to relinquish their 
control of the domestic bond market altogether. When, in the 
summer of 1984, the Securities Bureau suggested that Japanese 
bond rating agencies be established for the Euroyen market, banks 
objected. Banks feared bond rating would take root in the 
domestic market as well and render the Bond Committee 
obsolescent. 
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The Securities Bureau proposed a compromise: the IBJ and 
other trustee banks could join the Big Four securities firms to 
form a bond rating agency, the "Japan Investment Service."64 
There was some disagreement within the MOF, not to mention 
industry, as to the appropriateness of a bond rating agency 
comprised of the underwriters and trustees. The Securities 
Bureau, however, sensing that this was necessary compensation for 
cooperation, wanted to give the group its imprimatur. Meanwhile, 
the International Finance Bureau favored another group of large 
institutional investors including the Long Term Credit Bank of 
Japan, the trust banks, and the insurance companies. 
The MOF was concerned that there would not be enough 
business to keep both prospective bond rating agencies in the 
black. In addition to these two, there were others already in 
existence. The Japan Bond Research Institute, a subsidiary of 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, had been operating since the 1970s, though 
primarily as a publisher of bond-related information. Two 
American raters, Standard & Poor's and Moody's, also had offices 
in Tokyo since the 1980s, to gather information for Eurobond 
ratings. A fourth, Mikuni Investment Advisory Service, provided 
information to foreign investors on Japanese firms. Ultimately, 
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however, the MOF granted licenses to the two newcomers as well. 
It would worry about a shake out, or perhaps avoid one by 
establishing a division of labor, when the circumstances 
required. For the time being, the MOF bureaucrats reasoned, at 
least the machinery was in place for a gradual transition from 
the Bond Committee's rules to a bond rating system. 6 5 
Despite some easing of collateral requirements since the 
1970s, corporations were not returning to the domestic bond 
market from abroad. First, the number of corporations eligible 
to issue unsecured bonds was still small. In January 1985, TDK 
became the first company to issue an unsecured straight bond in 
the domestic market since 1932; only 23 other firms were 
similarly eligible. For the others, issuance was more costly. 
Until the high capital requirements were lowered, even 
corporations such as Mitsubishi Shoji and Hitachi, with AAA 
ratings in foreign markets, would not qualify for unsecured 
straight bond issuance in Japan. The standard indeed was relaxed 
in October 1985, but still only 57 corporations were now eligible 
to issue unsecured bonds.66 Secondly, there were rigidities in 
issuing conditions, such as a single issue date each month. 
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Third, and this was a legal provision rather than a customary 
rule established by the Bond Committee, firms could not issue in 
excess of twice their net worth.67 
The MOF's Securities Exchange Council, which had issued the 
1977 report proposing easier issuance terms, reconvened in May 
1985 to have another look at the problem. And this time, the 
situation was ripe for change. But as corporations and 
securities firms knew, an expansion of the domestic bond market 
would not come without some cost to themselves. Along with the 
Council's proposal to "eventually abolish" the collateral rule, 
was its call for tougher corporate disclosure rules to ensure 
market stability. The Council also stated that the Big Four's 
monopoly on underwriting, on fixed commissions, should be 
corrected. The MOF still would have to work out the 
implementation of these pronouncements, but this was the basic 
compromise.68 
Banks accepted, if reluctantly, the decision to double the 
number of corporations eligible for unsecured straight bonds and 
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convertible bonds, to 120 and 360 respectively. In exchange, 
banks received an expanded private placement market. The "no 
return rule" which prevented corporations from returning to the 
private placement market was to be abolished, allowing banks to 
place issues for firms an unlimited number of times. 
Furthermore, the concept of private placement itself had become 
more attractive to corporations since disclosure requirements, 
which were to be tightened for public placement, would be laxer 
where only institutional investors were involved. 6 9 
An important matter left unaddressed, because no compromise 
between the banking and securities industry could yet be forged, 
was the domestic commercial paper market. Though commercial 
paper, as a type of short term security, was on the Council's 
agenda for deregulation, the banking community was adamantly 
opposed to its introduction into Japan unless banks could 
underwrite them. Judging from the American market, where 
commercial paper has virtually replaced short term bank loans, 
Japanese banks feared the worst. And indeed, because city banks 
are barred from making long term loans in deference to the long 
term credit banks* and trust banks' special niche, CPs would 
probably hurt them considerably. But the price the banks 
demanded in compensation — the right to underwrite them and deal 
in them in the secondary market — was more than the securities 
industry was willing to grant. As with the Three Bureaus 
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Agreement, the dispute ended in stalemate as both sides awaited a 
preferable solution.70 
VIII. Conclusion 
Deregulation of the domestic bond market is not complete. 
By mid 1987 only 120 corporations, a small fragment of Japan's 
corporate world, are eligible to issue unsecured straight bonds 
in Japan. Considering that no corporations could issue without 
collateral until 1983, however, the pace of change is rapid 
indeed. 
Why Deregulation? 
The argument advanced here is that banks were forced by 
their own self interest to relax domestic issuance rules because 
corporations had the alternative of the Euromarket. Once 
corporations began to value the flexibility of the bond market 
over the security of bank indebtedness, banks* second best option 
was to recapture some of the bond business in the domestic 
private placement market. Banks were thus willing to trade away 
some control over domestic bond issuance. 
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To state the proposition in more general terms, Japan's 
international environment has effected significant changes i n 
Japan's domestic market structure. This reverses the usual line 
of causality cited in foreign policy literature where domestic 
politics is shown to generate changes in the international arena. 
Gourevitch, who conceived the phrase the "second image 
reversed," posits that "the international system is not only a 
consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of 
them".71 
Gourevitch also concedes that, "however compelling external 
pressures may be, they are unlikely to be fully determining." 
Even market forces must filter through the domestic political 
system before they take on power to change institutions and 
structures. If banks possessed a monopoly of domestic political 
resources, for example, they would simply ensure that leakage to 
the Euromarket be cut off: no firms would be allowed to raise 
funds abroad. In fact, banks are one of a number of powerful 
domestic interest groups. And indeed, other groups were willing 
to tolerate a highly regulated financial market for reasons of 
their own. Japanese corporations appreciated the convenience of 
bank loans during their rapid growth period, but also took 
increasing advantage of the Euromarket alternative. Non-bank 
institutional investors such as the insurance companies were 
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satisfied with stable, predictable returns until recently.72 And 
the securities firms were not eager to force change lest they 
forfeit their own protection including fixed underwriting and 
brokering commissions. 
Once banks found that corporations were not compelled to 
rely on bank borrowing merely because the domestic bond market 
was hard to access, the Bond Committee's control began to lose 
its perceived economic value. There is little point in holding 
the bottle neck if the bottle has a leak elsewhere. 
Deregulation of the domestic bond market was a reaction to, 
rather than a cause of, changes in Japanese corporate finance. 
Maturing Japanese corporations were moving away from bank 
dependence in favor of flexibility of direct financing since the 
early 1970s; the pressure on banks to accommodate increased as a 
growing number of firms began scaling down their bank debt and 
obtained access to the Euromarket. 
The Government-Business Nexus 
Through most of this narrative, the MOF has been an 
orchestrater, facilitater, or equilibrater; rarely an initiator. 
MOF's role varies, naturally, with its stake in issue areas. 
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Given the MOF's overarching goal of smooth regulation, its 
subsidiary goals with respect to the bond market are 1) market 
stability and 2) good relations with the financial institutions. 
Only more recently, since the mid 1970s, did the MOF have its own 
interest in ensuring that corporate bonds did not crowd out 
government bonds in the issuing market. But because of the large 
pool of private sector savings, this has never become a pressing 
concern. 
The MOF was content to entrust the problem of bond market 
stability to the banks. Since the Bond Committee formed in 193 3, 
the market had functioned well, and trustee banks ensured that 
investors received payment. The MOF permitted the banks to 
institutionalize their influence because this was a means of 
harnessing their commitment to the stability of the system. Thus 
the Bond Committee functioned as a sort of parapublic 
organization that simultaneously served a public and a private 
purpose. Without the MOF's sanction the Bond Committee could not 
have functioned.73 
The MOF's second goal, of maintaining good relations with 
the financial institutions that it regulates, was perhaps more 
delicate than the first. Securities firms had a direct interest 
in an expansion of the bond market as surely as banks did not. 
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Placating, or at least silencing the securities industry did not 
prove to be an indomitable task, however. The bond market 
continued to grow steadily in the postwar decades, even though 
the Euromarket issuances of Japanese corporations overtook the 
domestic issuances in the early 1980s. At least securities firms 
could not complain of falling profits. Secondly, the Three 
Bureaus Agreement ensured that securities firms would not lose 
the Eurobond market to the Japanese banks. Thirdly, the 
securities industry enjoyed its own protection in the form of 
fixed bond underwriting and brokering commissions. If the 
securities industry forced the banks1 hand on the bond market, 
the banks doubtless would agitate for competitive commissions. 
Finally, the politically most powerful securities companies, 
unlike in the banking industry where the small are strong in 
their own right, are the Big Four. These top four securities 
firms take three quarters of all bond underwriting commissions, 
partly because of their membership in the Bond Committee. 
Demand for change in the domestic bond market existed in 
both the securities industry and among would-be bond issuers, 
though both groups had reason for patience. Their demand was a 
constant; it was banks* acceptance of a barter that opened the 
way to bond market reform. Banks obtained a five-fold increase 
in the private placement market, in which they had free rein, in 
exchange for a doubling of the number of corporations that could 
issue unsecured domestic bonds. Securities firms accepted this 
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as a step towards an increasingly free bond market in which the 
Bond Committee would be replaced by bond rating agencies. 
Corporations were pleased at the expansion of the private 
placement market since the disclosure requirements are more 
lenient; but they, too, took the agreement as transitional 
towards greater freedom. 
The trajectory of further changes in the domestic bond 
market is quite clear. As a growing number of Japanese firms 
secure access to Euromarket financing, banks will be forced to 
provide the funding needs and preferences of their clientele. 
The relaxation of bond market rules was but one in a succession 
of competitive accommodations, including the introduction of 
market-based deposit instruments, and the slashing of 
compensating balance requirements. Furthermore, as Japan's 
financial system becomes increasingly open, a growing share of 
bank loans are to the small business sector and to the declining 
industries. 
